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ExOTA-Milter - Exchange Online Tenant Authorisation Milter (Mail-Filter)

The ExOTA-Milter application is written in python3 and derives from sdgathman´s pymilter.

Abstract/problem/motivation

Fact is that more and more companies are migrating their Outlook/Exchange environments to the Microsoft cloud.

The ExOTA-Milter is kind of an authentication helper which plays an essential as well as security-related role in the so called smarthost connector for Microsoft Exchange-Online scenario. The milter tries to close the gap of missing client SMTP-Auth capability of MS Exchange-Online when there´s a need to relay emails over a third party smarthost. According to this the MS Exchange-Online platform expects the smarthost to accept emails without any further authentication of users/tenants, which can lead to many misconfigured SMTP-relays!

So, the question is: How can an Exchange-Online user/tenant be identified by a smarthost?

Identification possibilities provided by Microsoft

Client-IP ranges specified by Microsoft

Microsoft provides an ACL as JSON file (ID: 10), which looks like this.

[...]
{
    "id": 10,
    "serviceArea": "Exchange",
    "serviceAreaDisplayName": "Exchange Online",
    "urls": [
      "*.mail.protection.outlook.com"
    ],
    "ips": [
      "40.92.0.0/15",
      "40.107.0.0/16",
      "52.100.0.0/14",
      "104.47.0.0/17",
      "2a01:111:f400::/48",
      "2a01:111:f403::/48"
    ],
    "tcpPorts": "25",
    "expressRoute": true,
    "category": "Allow",
    "required": true
  }
[...]

The problem of this IP based ACL is that many other Exchange-Online customers/tenants are sending from the same IP-ranges as well! This means that many smarthost configured to relay mails comming from Exchange-Online tends to be an open relay (for Microsoft customers) unless additional authentication mechanism on a higher layer than IP takes place! IP-address based ACLs are definitely not the right way to achieve this!

x509 client certificate presented by Exchange-Online

The Exchange-Online platform also presents a x509 client certificate to identitfy onself to the smarthost. Taking a closer look at the received header we´ll notice that the certificates common name (CN) mail.protection.outlook.com is not realy tenant specific. Although the certificate provides additional security regarding the identity of the client system, it does not provide identity regarding the tenant. IMHO that´s stil not enough to permit relaying!

Received: from DEU01-FR2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-fr2deu01lp2173.outbound.protection.outlook.com [104.47.11.173])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(Client CN "mail.protection.outlook.com", Issuer "GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G3" (verified OK))
	by some.secure.smarthost.example.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CjqCQ2WRCzGjg6
	for <blah.blubb@example.com>; Sat, 28 Nov 2020 12:34:26 +0100 (CET)

Client certificate verification is the job of the underlying MTA. So the ExOTA-Milter does not validate the client certificate itself, but it can be enabled (disabled per default) to match for the expected client CN. The emailserver Postfix, for example, only provides the client CN to the milter API if the client certificate was successfully validated. Otherwise the ExOTA-Milter will not see the client CN over the milter protocol (postfix milter macro {cert_subject}) which results in a milter reject action.

DKIM - DomainKey Identified Message

Nevertheless, as Microsoft supports DKIM-signing for outbound email traffic the ExOTA-Milter can be used to authenticate sending tenants, respectively their sender domains, based on the cryptographic capabilities of DKIM. In fact the ExOTA-Milter does not validate the DKIM-signatures itself. Instead it simply parses DKIM-specific Authentication-Results headers produced by any previously DKIM-validating milter (like OpenDKIM, Rspamd or AMavis) in the chain. I personally prefer OpenDKIM as it´s lightweight and fully focused on DKIM.

DKIM-Signature headers appended by the Exchange-Online platform look like this:

[...]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
 d=tenantdomain.onmicrosoft.com; s=selector1-tenantdomain-onmicrosoft-com;
 h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck;
 bh=KWHUKEKZxeQyFbKe45TV1PJMC2XrVCMTFkdwSYWR6o0=;
 b=DYTLJtLFjvVrSZtZQagTwuEe5PQYqrNGi7hR5bkhO[...snip...]
[...]

Authentication-Results headers provided by OpenDKIM (signature validated) look like this:

[...]
Authentication-Results: trusted.dkim.validating.relay;  dkim=pass header.d=tenantdomain.onmicrosoft.com header.s=selector1-tenantdomain-onmicrosoft-com header.b=mmmjFpv8"
[...]

X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id header (policy binding)

Further each Microsoft Exchange-Online tenant has a unique tenant-ID in form of a UUID (RFC 4122). ExOTA-Milter extracts the tenant-ID from the X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id email header and uses it as a mandatory authentication factor.

[...]
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: <UUID-of-tenant>
[...]

At last the ExOTA-Milter needs an additional policy (JSON file), that provides a mapping of sender-domain <-> tenant-id and if DKIM-signatures must be taken under consideration or not. The JSON policy file itself looks like this:

{
  "yad.onmicrosoft.com": {
    "tenant_id": "1234abcd-18c5-45e8-88de-123456789abc",
    "dkim_enabled": true
  }
}

Actually I´m also working on a LDAP-based version as policy backend.

The solution

So, how can an Exchange-Online user/tenant be identified by a third party smarthost?

Finally it´s the combination of all of the above discussed aspects which may result in a robust-enough smarthost setup used by the Exchange-Online platform:

  • restriction of client IPs via ACL (MTA)
  • verification of Microsoft´s x509 client certificate (MTA)
  • matching for client certificate´s CN (ExOTA-Milter)
  • verification of DKIM signatures providing Authentication-Results header (another milter, e.g. OpenDKIM)
  • consideration of DKIM verification results per sender domain (ExOTA-Milter)
  • matching for tenant-id provided in X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id header (ExOTA-Milter)

How about a docker/OCI image?

Using prebuilt images from dockerhub.com

WIP ;-)

Build your own image

Take a look here

How to test?

First of all please take a look at how to set up the testing environment, which is described here